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Though economically-rationalist belief systems seem less invasive than they were in 
the 1990s, market and quasi-market ideology is still being applied as a strategy for 
improving the outcomes of welfare programs.  The following discussion examines 
remote Northern Territory (NT) Indigenous housing provision as a case study of the 
potential irrationality of using quasi-markets within social intervention strategy.  This 
case study is a generalizeable example of ideology-based quasi-market provision.  
Thus the discussion concludes by considering implications associated with private 
sector participation in social intervention, and explores a better way to conceptualize 
and deal with problematic policies.  
 
The study incorporates a brief historical foray into the terminology and quasi-market 
assumptions which underpin the logic of NT social intervention strategy.  The 
examination reflects on the nature of Indigenous living conditions; the intentions of 
government intervention; the interpretation and logic of these intentions and the 
consequent processes of intervention.  It is assumed that such reflections are essential 
to the formation of good policy and that insights into existing policy are possible if 
this logical process is used.  Thus the discussion commences with an examination of 
Indigenous living conditions intervention in its historical context, and then it reflects 
on the intentions of this intervention.  It hinges on a re-examination of human need as 
the focus of existing and future policy development. 
 
 
Historically Derived Definitions  
 
After a  referendum in 1967 Australia’s Commonwealth government became 
responsible for administering an Indigenous population which since European 
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colonization had had their hunting and foraging ‘economic culture’ seriously 
constrained through over-concentration in settlements (Memmott & Moran 2001). 
These people had suffered considerable decreases in the ‘surplus production’ which 
had previously sustained their quality of life (Briscoe 1989:200, Thompson 2004).  
When in 1972 ‘Social Assistance’ reforms highlighted the ‘underprivileged’ status of 
Indigenous Australians (Sanders 1990, Hughes 1995, Memmott & Moran 2001, 
Thompson 2004) their subsequent living conditions became the focus of increasing 
scrutiny by Commonwealth social welfare administrators (Hughes 1995, Thompson 
2004).  Under these circumstances those individuals in the Northern Territory who 
lived a more traditional Indigenous lifestyle were ‘problematised’ and became the 
focus of a government intervention apparatus which sought to house and normalise 
them (Thompson 2004).   
 
Though the conservative welfare logic of the 1960s had presented Indigenous people 
as deprived primitives who required ‘advancement’ (Hughes 1995, Thompson 2004) 
the social-democrat intervention of the 1970s established the contemporary focus on 
‘self-determination’ and provision according to measured ‘need’ (Sanders 1990, 
Hughes 1995, Thompson 2004).  The humanitarian ‘Liberal’ government of the mid 
1970s to early 1980s; the social democrat (Labor) government of the 1980s to mid 
1990s; and then the socially conservative/market liberal (Liberal) government of the 
contemporary period (2005), have continued to intervene in Indigenous living 
conditions according to the ‘need’ for housing, the ‘need’ for health services and the 
‘need’ for educational services. 
 
In this context, successive Commonwealth and NT Governments concur that most 
remote-dwelling Indigenous people lack, but will not be provided with, sufficient 
resources to individually purchase the goods and services deemed needed for 
adequate satisfaction (Thompson 2004).  Rather than permitting individual 
determination of needs, successive Commonwealth (and NT) Governments have 
resolved to socially assess and provide these housing, health and educational ‘needs’ 
(Thompson 2004, Thompson 2005).  The construction of remote NT Indigenous 
houses is subject to ‘tendering processes’, private sector construction and some 
economic choice mechanisms.  Thus it can be considered to be a quasi-market 
intervention process. 
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 At this time (2005) social provision of housing, education and health services are the 
norm in remote NT Indigenous communities (Thompson 2005), quasi-market 
construction mechanisms are deployed in this aim (Thompson 2004), and therefore 
the economic-rationality of this convention can be critically examined.  
 
Modes of Social Intervention: Justifications and Assumptions  
 
Any criticism of social provision processes must be cognisant of the intentions of 
social provision as these provide the benchmarks against which its success can be 
measured.  These intentions can be derived from the historical make-up of Indigenous 
social provision. 
 
Since Elizabethan times there has been official acknowledgement that the needs of 
some marginalised members of the community must be met socially if their personal 
problems are to be prevented from becoming significant social problems (Tomlinson 
1989).  Since the 1960s the Australian Government has intervened in the housing 
circumstances of Indigenous communities to address an evidently problematic need 
for better Indigenous living conditions (Sanders 1990, Thompson 2004). 
 
Since the 1970s, problematic unmet needs have been constructed as quantifiable 
phenomena which can be addressed scientifically by modern policy intervention 
(Sanders 1990).  When in 1972 Jonathan Bradshaw described needs as quantifiable 
phenomena, there was first an academic and then a general acceptance that scientific 
social intervention would address certain statistically determined ‘needs’ which the 
market fails to supply to the needy (Thomson 2004).  Quality social intervention 
strategies, including Indigenous housing programs, have focussed their activities on 
meeting carefully measured needs. 
 
Academic interest in the 1970s and 1980s developed ‘Social Need’ theory into a 
scientific basis for providing the services which are used to meet the documented 
needs of officially disadvantaged members of the community.  Thus need theory 
literature described the most efficient strategies for socially providing goods and 
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social services (Thompson 2004) and in the late 1980s and early 1990s the 
Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing, Local Government and Community 
Services (HHLGCS) included a staffing division which developed quantitative 
regional need maps and subsequent social provision plans for social policy programs.  
As a concession to modern rationality, the Australian Government (and NT 
Government) institutionalised needs-based planning for the social provision of 
Indigenous housing programs. As the provision of Indigenous housing fell within the 
planning portfolios of HHLGCS and NT Department of Housing their planning 
processes can be evaluated against their success in satisfying the needs of consumers. 
 
Consultative Processes: Justifications and Assumptions 
 
In light of apparent policy concern with consumer ‘needs’, the needs based provision 
strategy which formed in the 1990s was a rational approach, incorporating 
mechanisms to accurately determine needs and to efficiently provide for them 
(HHLGCS 1991, Thompson 2004).  How this incorporated quasi-market provision, 
and the consequences of this for actual client needs, requires further consideration. 
 
By the early 1990s the Commonwealth recognised that its own planing processes and 
those of the NT Department of Lands and Housing were quite insensitive to the real 
requirements of consumers (Thompson1 1991-2).  Logically where provisions are 
insensitive and actual needs are not serviced, the policy intervention achieves nothing 
and policy-makers are perceived ineffective.  In response to such concerns there were 
moves at this time to sensitise the planning and provision processes so that they 
responded better to the specific needs of consumers.   
 
In the early 1990s the HHLGCS approach expanded the quantitative role of expert 
planning committees to include consumer representatives who were to focus on 
qualitative aspects of client needs. The early (1990s) Northern Territory Advisory 
Committee on Aboriginal Housing (NTACAH) allocated housing funds according to 
‘State-Plan’s which were developed by NT bureaucrats but were endorsed by elected 
                                                 
1 This accords with observations of this author when imposing planning strategy on NT Lands and 
Housing as program administrator for HHLGCS at this time. 
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Indigenous representatives. This NTACAH and its more recent derivative the 
Indigenous Housing Authority of the Northern Territory (IHANT) allocated funds to 
Indigenous Community Councils (or housing organizations) to build housing in 
Indigenous communities.  Eventually Indigenous representatives numerically 
dominated the consultative body in order to ensure cultural sensitivity, yet the 
allocation process was increasingly required to include concessions to mainstream 
infrastructure planning standards, health standards, building standards and cost 
constraints. 
   
Logically these factors constrained the sensitizativity of planning in respect to specific 
individual requirements.  Though the HHLG&CS ideology sought to entrench 
consumer representation and a sensitivity to local needs the idea that one 
‘representative’ individual can (or may desire to) accurately determine the needs of 
another requires logical consideration.  Thus there seem individual and regulatory 
constraints on the satisfying qualities of the provision strategies which need 
examination. 
 
In the case of remote NT Indigenous housing, construction and management is carried 
out under the supervision of Indigenous organizations or councils.  Though 
Indigenous representatives seem dominant in the resource distribution processe (the 
consultative committee) and Indigenous boards or councils administer the actual 
community housing, the implementation of mainstream standards must mitigate 
against consumer outcomes.  Evaluation processes which ensure program 
effectiveness should then assess that these mechanisms effectively and efficiently 
deliver ‘needed’ goods and achieve increased consumer satisfaction (Thompson 
2004).  Thus when market mechanisms are deployed in constructing housing there is 
some onus on them to ensure that competitive suppliers seek to service the needs of 
consumers through free choice mechanisms.  Beyond the ideology of this provision 
there is thus reason to examine the real processes and impacts of Indigenous housing 
policy on client needs. 
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Applying Quasi-Market Theory to Need: A Critique 
In light of the centrality of need as a policy objective it is important to consider the 
logic that explains mainstream need satisfaction processes as a point of comparison 
with the above social provision mechanisms.  The subsequent discussion will examine 
market provision mechanisms and consider their need satisfaction function.  It will 
then consider the logic of NT indigenous housing provision strategy against this 
mainstream ideal. 
 
Classical liberal values have for centuries advocated for capitalist market provision 
processes.  This ideology upholds basic economic principles about the superiority of 
capitalist supply/demand dynamics based on freely determined decision-making.  
Simply, the actions of rational consumers ensure that an optimum level of satisfaction 
is realized after individuals with limited resources allocate these resources to their 
highest priorities.  Accordingly, priorities are determined as people judge the best 
items which provide the most satisfaction for the least amount of money.  This 
selection process is manifest in fund allocation and therefore stimulates suppliers to 
provide goods which are attuned to the specific desires of consumers.  
 
As a consequence of these liberal values, economic-rationalist logic holds that the 
best way to satisfy consumers, and therefore the most justifiable way to distribute 
needed goods, is by individual consumers freely deploying their limited resources and 
choosing the best from a variety of potential sources (suppliers). This logic 
emphasises the inferiority of social provision processes which constrain decision-
making through centralised planning (and interventionism).  From ideologically 
(classical) liberal or economically-rationalist perspectives, the intervention into 
Indigenous housing and education is a manifestation of a ‘realm of coercion’ 
(government) implementing control over economically independent individuals (see 
Heywood 1992 & Hughes 1995).  Accordingly Hughes2 (1995) has argued that 
government intervention has constrained the independent decision-making which had 
allowed Indigenous individuals real ‘self-determination’ and therefore the freedom to 
satisfy their basic, social and artistic needs (See Zastrow & Kirst-Ashman 2004:389-
91; Locke 1992).  Rationally, the efficiency and effectiveness of their individual 
                                                 
2 From a different ideological perspective. 
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satisfaction strategies is constrained rather than improved by intervention which limits 
self-determination. 
 
According to economic rationalist logic it seems that the interests of better provision 
of Indigenous housing services might require the application of markets or quasi-
markets which recreate service-purchaser/private-sector supplier conditions.  The NT 
Department of Lands and Housing actually did begin contracting out the construction 
of its Indigenous housing in the late 1980s and public-housing authorities in Australia 
have dabbled with tendering and outsourcing of housing construction.  Now the quasi-
market approach to housing construction underpins the construction of remote 
Indigenous housing in the Northern Territory and is evident in other State-based 
Indigenous housing portfolios.  According to economic rationalist ideology, where 
Indigenous purchasers are empowered to select the builder who provides the best 
value for money infrastructure then it is arguable that their disadvantaged 
communities will receive the maximum benefit possible from government social 
intervention transfers. 
 
Thus the NT case study can be evaluated as a mechanism for sensitising social 
provision.  Logically such private participation has been considered to be both a 
means to ensure efficiency in the construction of the housing and a strategy to ensure 
that consumers received the most satisfying product.  It should also ensure that the 
purchaser is able to select the supplier who can provide them with the closest 
approximation to their requirements for the approved cost. 
   
The actual housing construction process which delivers the services to the 
communities is contracted to private-sector building companies.  It should not 
however be assumed that this private servicing arrangement acts substantially to 
ensure that Indigenous consumers’ needs are serviced.  Though the market 
mechanism is perceived effective in servicing mainstream needs, it will service 
Indigenous needs only where Indigenous people are given market power to purchase 
needed services (housing).   As this does not occur the process is not rational and 




Irrationality in Provision Processes: Examined 
 
The quasi-market mechanism above can be considered a highly irrational individual 
need-satisfaction strategy.  To summarise, though individuals are satisfied by market 
(supply/demand) mechanisms, this satisfaction occurs because consumers are able to 
determine their priority needs, allocate resources to satisfying these needs, and 
‘demand’ ever-better products to achieve need satisfaction (demand).  Yet if social 
provision processes are prioritized by bureaucrats, allocated by ‘consultative’ 
representatives, purchased by representative organizations and do not empower 
clients, then they are not a need satisfaction mechanism.  Rational economics assumes 
that individuals act from self-interest and therefore it is illogical to apply market logic 
to social provision and at the same time assume that representatives and organisations 
will make choices based on the needs of other individuals (clients).  
 
If the mechanism does not rationally focus on meeting the client’s needs, which are its 
stated objectives, then there is onus on the evaluation mechanism to ensure that this 
policy-failure is highlighted.  Yet it has been previously shown that the Indigenous 
housing evaluation process examines the effectiveness and efficiency of the delivery 
rather than the outcomes of that delivery (Thompson 2004).  Evidently the 
methodology for improving Indigenous policy outcomes focussed on the effectiveness 
of the administrators in achieving policy benchmarks and it did not clarify policy 
objectives or examine better strategy for rationally meeting these objectives.   
 
In summary the mode of Indigenous social housing provision used is a process for 
increasing the satisfaction of client needs, yet it does not actually involve those needs 
at any stage of the process.  Only a misunderstanding of the concept need could 
permit such irrationality.  Thus there is a problem in the conceptualization of need 
which impacts on the success of social provision and requires further examination. 
 
Improving Policy Outcomes by Reconceptualizing the Need 
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If the intentions of the social provision of Indigenous housing are confused by the 
application of quasi-market mechanisms then there is reason to reconceptualise the 
process.  If however, there is a fatal flaw in the conceptualization of the policy 
process then there is reason to reconceptualise the objectives of the policy.  Either 
way there is reason to consider the role of need satisfaction within this policy.  This 
reconsideration requires a theoretical examination of the self-determining need-
satisfaction strategies.   This reconsideration must occur in the light of clear 
understanding of the intentions of policy, the logic of self-determination and the 
nature of need satisfaction. 
 
Logically, if social policy responds to perceived social problems, and these perceived 
problems result from unmet individual needs, then social intervention which focuses 
on meeting problematic individual needs will assist.  If both hunter-gatherer and 
consumer decision-making processes are based on rationally determined priorities, 
rational allocations of resources (to those priorities) and satisfying consumption, then 
policy should recognise that individual priority setting is central to need satisfaction.  
In accord with this view the principles of ‘empowerment practice’ posit that 
individuals who have problems must be able to articulate those problems and, given 
sufficient resources, will strategically deal with those problems (Payne 1991:234).  
Thus it can be assumed that Indigenous clients who actually ‘need’ housing assistance 
will demonstrate that housing is a priority problem for them and will allocate 
resources to satisfy their housing need.  Thus if Government genuinely wants to 
satisfy ‘needs’ it can ask clients what their priorities are and it can assist them to meet 
these priorities. 
 
This assumes that government social intervention really does focus on client needs, an 
assumption which requires consideration.  Thompson (2004) found evidence that the 
provision of ‘needed’ housing, rather than being a strategy for meeting Indigenous 
priorities has been a coercive intervention aimed at modifying the perceived 
problematic nature of Indigenous life-styles.  This work argued that assimilation has 
continuously underpinned the policy model since mid 1960s (see also Hughes 1995).  
Further this research also argued that the drive to meet needs is a physiologically 
determined/ culturally mediated phenomenon and will not easily be thwarted by the 
impositions of policy intervention.  As argued by ‘empowerment practice’ theory, 
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satisfying change is only achieved by working with client priorities (needs) and 
assisting their strategies.  Thus clients will act to satisfy their needs irrespective of 
government intervention and intervention which thwarts need satisfaction will only 
achieve resource wastage. 
 
 
Rational economic argument assumes that individuals act according to self interest 
and therefore if client need satisfaction is the measured benchmark of successful 
policy implementation, then bureaucrats who strive for success would strive for client 
satisfaction.  It was clear above that the methodology of social policy evaluation was 
focussed on determining the efficiency of provision processes rather than the degree 
of satisfaction.  If Sanders (1990) is correct, then social policy focuses more on the 
satisfaction of powerful stakeholders than the needs of clients will continue to thwart 
needs and will continue to fail. 
 
Where the success of social programs is measured against efficient processes, ‘need’ 
will continue to be conceptualised as the volume of goods or services which is 
predetermined necessary by bureaucratic expediency.  In such circumstances private 
sector suppliers may efficiently supply the product and facilitate bureaucratic 
effectiveness.  Client needs may never be satisfied under such circumstances as the 
failure of social programs is traditionally highlighted as a moral failure on the part of 
delinquent clients (see Thompson 2004).  For this reason program ineffectiveness 
does not normally reflect on the perceived effectiveness of the bureaucrats.  Under 
these circumstances bureaucrats are ideally situated to continually benefit from 
efficiently intervening in social problems, without ever meeting needs and achieving 
the solutions which would make their role redundant.  Improved policy, under these 
circumstances never measurably achieves any solution to the social problem it 
addresses though bureaucrats may be rewarded for its implementation.  This is the 
long-term scenario in Indigenous housing policy (see Sanders 1990; Thompson 2004). 
 
By contrast if Indigenous housing policy is evaluated against the increasing quality of 
life of Indigenous clients then there will be process improvement and economic 





Berndt R.M. & Berndt C.M. (1992) The World of the First Australians: Aboriginal 
Traditonal Life Past and Present, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra. 
Briscoe, Gordon (1989) “Class, ‘Welfare’ and Capitalism: The Role Aborigines have 
Played in the State-building Procewsses in Northern Territory History”, 197-216 
in Richard Kennedy Australian Welfare: Historical Sociology, Macmillan, South 
Melbourne. 
Bradshaw, J., (1972) The Concept of Social Need, New Society, Vol. 19, No. 496, 
pp640-3. 
Heywood, Andrew, (1992) Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Macmillan, London. 
HHLGCS, (1993) Annual Report (1991-92) Department of Health Housing Local 
Government and Community Services, AGPS, Canberra. 
Hughes, I., (1995) Dependant Autonomy: A New Phase of Internal Colonialism, 
Australian Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 369-389. 
Locke, E.A. (1991) The Motivation Sequence, the Motivation Hub, and the Motivation 
Core, Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Process Vol 50, pp288-99. 
Memmott, P. & Moran, M. (2001) Indigenous Settlements of Australia, Department of 
Environment and Heritage, 
http://www.ea.gov.au/soe/techpapers/indigenous/population.html
Memmott, P. & Go-Sam, C. (2003) “Synthesising Indigenous Housing Paradigms: An 
Introduction to Take 2”, in p. Memmott ed., Take2 Housing Design in Indigenous 
Communities, RAIA, Red Hill, ACT, pp. 13-15. 
Payne, M.S., (1991) Modern Social Work Theory: a critical introduction, Macmillan, 
London. 
Qld Government (2005) Department of Housing: Improving Peoples Lives through 
Housing and Community Renewal, http://www.housing.qld.gov.au. 
Sanders, W., (1990) Reconstructing Aboriginal Housing policy for Remote 
Communities: How Much Room for Manoeuvre, Aust. J Pub. Admin., Vol. 49, 1 
March 1990, pp. 38-50.  
 12
Tomlinson, J.R. (1989) Income Maintenance in Australia: The Income Guarantee 
Alternative, Dissertation Submitted as a requirement for Doctor of Philosophy, 
Murdoch University, W.A. 
Thompson, L.J., (2004) The Indigenous Living Conditions Problem: ‘Need’, Policy 
Construction, and Potential for Change, Doctoral Dissertation, Faculty of 
Engineering, Physical Sciences & Architecture, University of Queensland.  
Thompson, L.J., (2005) Compassionate Coercion as a Policy Model: Reflections on 
Practical Reconciliation & Mutual Obligation for Indigenous Living Conditions, 
Draft Manuscript for AJSI 2005.  
Zastro C.H. & Kirst-Ashman K.K. (2004) Understanding Human Behaviour and the 
Social Environment 6th ed, Brooks Cole, Belmont, Ca. 
 13
